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I.

INTRODUCTION

As children, parents would dictate rules for the house; after all, it is
their house, their rules. As time endures, a child explores greater freedom
and in entering adolescence, questions that freedom. While exploring that
autonomy, responsible parents begin to help their child understand this
journey, and ultimately attempt to protect the child. Around the time of the
“birds and bees” talk, a new rule of the house is implemented: the “open
door policy”—when someone of the opposite sex is in your room, the door
is kept open. As adolescents struggle to enter adulthood, these rules are
bent, modified, and even broken. The bedroom becomes one of the most
private places in your life, and the door is closed in order to respect that
privacy.

1.
The search for “greater freedom” is quoted from Justice Anthony Kennedy in
his conclusions in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003), noting the impact each
generation has in determining the validity of laws.

1
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Now, consider the same scenario, except with the government assuming this aforementioned role of the parent, and its citizenry playing the role
of the child. As long as the government maintains its role as the parent in
this context, it does not seem likely that the child would ever move on to
have his or her own bedroom that is strictly under his or her own rules. Under this presumption, what rules would be acceptable then? Would it be
appropriate for parents to censor certain things the child buys? Would it be
suitable for parents to choose who the child is allowed to bring into the bedroom? The latter question seems to be the more personal one, and thus, the
one open to less regulation. In the event that what is purchased, however,
directly correlates with what activities take place in the bedroom, the rules
controlling those actions become less clear as to which conduct the law is
truly regulating—commercial or sexual. Thus, this Note focuses on how sex
toys provide an excellent foundation to explore this debate.
This Note begins with a historical overview of United States Supreme
Court cases that have prompted the evolution of sexual privacy interests.2 It
then focuses on the anti-vibrator statute3 that has been struck down in the
Fifth Circuit through Reliable Consultants v. Earle, Inc.4 An analysis of the
Reliable court’s implementation of Lawrence v. Texas5 follows,6 looking
specifically at whether or not the Supreme Court acknowledged sexual privacy as a fundamental right, and as a result, whether or not the Reliable
majority invoked the scope of the Lawrence holding properly.7 It then critically evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the three main arguments
made in the dissenting opinions to the recent denial for a rehearing en banc,
which were published six months subsequent to the original holding of Reliable.8 Through this examination, the Note specifically addresses the circuit split between the Fifth Circuit’s9 interpretation of Lawrence as an extension of sexual liberty into the commercial realm and the Eleventh Circuit’s10 narrow application of the liberty interest announced in Lawrence.11
Although this Note disagrees with the Reliable majority’s holding,12 this
Note is also in disagreement with the arguments made by the Reliable dis-

2.
See discussion infra Part II.
3.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21 (Vernon 2003).
4.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008), reh’g denied,
538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008)
5.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
6.
See discussion infra Part IV.
7.
See discussion infra Parts IV-V.A.
8.
See discussion infra Part V.
9.
Reliable, 517 F.3d 738.
10.
Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
11.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12.
See discussion infra Part VI.
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senting opinions for a rehearing en banc.13 Ultimately, this article concludes
that the Reliable majority misapplied the Lawrence holding, and as a result,
improperly extended Lawrence’s sexual liberty interest into the commercial
realm.14

II.

THE BEGINNING OF “PRIVACY” RIGHTS

The purpose of this Part is to briefly introduce a few, not all, United
States Supreme Court cases that can be traced to the evolvement of sexual
privacy or sexual liberty rights in constitutional jurisprudence.15 As a starting point that deals with purchases made specifically for sexual conduct, the
case of Griswold v. Connecticut dealt with a Connecticut statute16 that prohibited the use of contraceptives.17 In order to test the constitutionality of
the contraceptives law, Estelle Griswold and Dr. C. Lee Buxton opened a
birth control clinic in New Haven, Connecticut.18 Soon after the clinic was
opened, Griswold and Dr. Buxton were charged, tried, found guilty, and
fined for giving “information, instruction, and medical advice to married
persons as to the means of preventing conception.”19 In 1965, the United
States Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that this statute was unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the right to marital privacy.20 Justice
William O. Douglas, in the majority opinion, reasoned that although the
Constitution does not explicitly enumerate a general protected right to pri-

13.
See discussion infra Parts V-VI.
14.
See discussion infra Part VI.
15.
Purposely, the author reserves the following cases to statutes involving contraceptives. Although it is clearly evident that Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), are any constitutional scholar’s staple precedents when engaging in debate about sexual privacy rights, in an
attempt to keep the “commercial” concentration of this Note’s argument intact, the focus
will not extend to the fundamental right to abortion—as the right to contraceptives is already
considered a fundamental right. Additionally, the sexual rights of homosexuals may arguably be implicated by the issues at stake in the case at hand; however, because the Note’s
argument focuses on substantive due process, the author will be evading any equal protection argument and, consequently, avoiding Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
16.
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (repealed 1971). Section 53-32 provides,
“Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days
nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.” Id. § 53-32. Section 54-196 provides, “Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.” Id. §
54-196.
17.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id. at 485-86.
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vacy,21 the various guarantees found within different amendments in the
Bill of Rights created penumbras22 that established a right of privacy.23 Justice Douglas found these penumbras in the First,24 Third,25 Fourth,26 and
Ninth27 Amendments to create a new constitutional right—the “right of
marital privacy.”28 The Court found that the Connecticut statute conflicted
with the exercise of this right of privacy and held the statute to be unconstitutional.29

21.
Id. at 482. Justice Douglas explains how the Court’s purpose is not to evaluate
the legislature’s choice of policing economic affairs, but because the statute involves privacy
issues, it is within the Court’s review: “We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or
social conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband
and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation.” Id. (emphasis added).
22.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1170-71 (8th ed. 2004) (“In constitutional law, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras
containing implied rights, esp. the right of privacy.”); see also MARK V. TUSHNET, WARREN
COURT: IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 180 n.61 (Mark Tushnet, ed., 1993)
(“One might note here that Douglas did not invent the idea of a penumbra doctrine. Black’s
Law Dictionary traces it to an early federal eminent domain decision, Kohl v. United States,
91 U.S. 367 (1875). Holmes used the notion in the wiretap case, Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928).”).
23.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-86.
24.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.”).
25.
U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”).
26.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
27.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
28.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Although Justice
Douglas does not use the exact words, “the right of marital privacy,” he refers to the majority opinion, in his concurring opinion, with this phrase. Id. Justice Goldberg contends that
the language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveals that the Framers of the Constitution left the door open for additional fundamental rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the first eight amendments. Id. at 488-93. Justice Goldberg stated, “The entire fabric
of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate
that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and
magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected.” Id. at 495. In applying this
logic, he went on to state that “[b]y ignoring marital privacy rights, you ignore the 9th
Amendment and give it no effect.” Id.
29.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
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As time went on, the application of this privacy right expanded beyond
strictly the sanctity of marriage.30 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the United States
Supreme Court extended the “right of privacy” found in Griswold to unmarried couples.31 William Baird was convicted under an anti-contraceptive
statute32 for two reasons: “[F]irst, for exhibiting contraceptive articles in the
course of delivering a lecture on contraception to a group of students at
Boston University and, second, for giving a young woman a package of
Emko vaginal foam at the close of his address.”33 In the majority opinion,
Justice William J. Brennan reasoned that under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,34 to deny unmarried couples the right to use
contraception when married couples did have that right would indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause.35 Thus, the “right of marital privacy”
reached beyond the sanctity of marriage and into the realm of the sexual
liberty of the intimate human relationship itself.
In Carey v. Population Services International, a New York statute36
prohibited the advertisement or display of contraceptives, distribution of
contraceptives by anyone other than a licensed pharmacist, and distribution
of contraceptives to anyone under sixteen.37 Population Services International, a nonprofit corporation disseminating birth control information and
services, along with other plaintiffs,38 challenged the statute on the grounds
that it unconstitutionally burdened the fundamental decision of “whether or
not to beget or bear a child.”39 Justice Brennan, in his majority opinion,
rejected the state’s arguments that limiting access to contraceptives substan30.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481
(making this distinction by stating that the issue in Griswold revolved around “an intimate
relation of husband and wife”).
31.
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
32.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 21 (2000).
33.
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 440.
34.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause is found in the language
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, "[N]o state shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Id.
35.
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55.
36.
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972). Under this statute, it is a crime
(1) for any person to sell or distribute any contraceptive of any kind to a minor under the age
of 16 years; (2) for anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to
persons 16 or over; and (3) for anyone, including licensed pharmacists, to advertise or display contraceptives. Id.
37.
Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977).
38.
Id. at 682. Other plaintiffs included the following: “Rev. James B. Hagen, a
minister and director of a venereal disease prevention program that distributes contraceptive
devices; three physicians specializing in family planning, pediatrics, and obstetricsgynecology; and an adult New York resident who alleges that the statute inhibits his access
to contraceptive devices and information, and his freedom to distribute the same to his minor
children.” Id.
39.
Id. at 685.
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tially discourages early sexual behavior and implicates the state’s interest in
protecting minors.40 Considering that the “scope of permissible state regulation is broader as to minors than as to adults,” the Court still found that “for
in a field that by definition concerns the most intimate of human activities
and relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent conception
are among the most private and sensitive,”41 and accordingly, struck down
the regulation in absence of “compelling state interests . . . narrowly drawn
to express only those interests.”42
The outcome of a right not enumerated in the Constitution of the
United States greatly depends on how the specific right or interest asserted
is framed.43 The United States Supreme Court possesses rather broad power
in determining how to frame the interest asserted in terms of the scope of
the statute in question, and thus, the subsequent outcome of the matter.44 In
the case of Washington v. Glucksberg, the respondents, Harold Glucksberg
and physicians who practice in Washington, argued that the statute45 banning assisted suicide violated their “right to die.”46 Instead, the Court
framed the right asserted more narrowly as the right to assisted suicide, not
the right to die.47 The Court stated that assisted suicide has always been
offensive to our national traditions and practices, and thus, there is great
deference to laws that have consistently rejected assisted suicide.48 Subsequently, the Court “concluded that the asserted ‘right’ to assistance in
committing suicide is not a fundamental49 liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause.”50

40.
Id. at 694-96.
41.
Id. at 685. Additionally, the Court cited Eisenstadt in order to further support
the importance of this right: “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Id. at
678 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
42.
Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
43.
See discussion infra Part V.C.
44.
See discussion infra Part V.C.
45.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1994).
46.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997).
47.
Id. at 722. The Ninth Circuit stated that the issue was, “Is there a right to die?”
Compassion in Dying v. State, 79 F.3d 790, 799 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Justice Rehnquist, instead, stated that “the question before
us is whether the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 723.
48.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
49.
See discussion infra Part V.C.
50.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (emphasis added).
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Thus, when the Glucksberg Court found that no fundamental liberty
interest existed, they employed mere rationality as its standard of review.51
On the other hand, if the Court in Glucksberg were to have found that a
fundamental right indeed existed, the Court would have employed a standard of review known as strict scrutiny.52 There is a great deal of criticism
concerning the rigid two-tier approach and the predictable outcome that will
result53—if the Court invokes a mere rationality standard, the government
will almost always win; if strict scrutiny, the petitioner will normally
emerge victorious.54 Thus, when analyzing the substantive due process constitutionality of a statute, it can be argued that the most important step in
analyzing a case involving a statute that restricts the sale, advertising, giving, or lending of any device designed or marketed for sexual stimulation, is
to first identify what the government is regulating: a liberty interest or a
fundamental right.

III. ANTI-VIBRATOR LAWS—COMMERCIAL REGULATION OR
PRIVACY INVASION? ENTER: RELIABLE CONSULTANTS V. EARLE
The case of Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle55 originated in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in 2004,
when businesses that sold sexual devices challenged a Texas statute56 that
criminalized the selling, advertising, giving, or lending of any device designed or marketed for sexual stimulation.57 Reliable Consultants, Inc. operated four retail stores in Texas that sold sexual devices.58 Additionally,
51.
Id. at 728. The Court applied a rationality test when they found no fundamental
liberty: “[O]ur decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The
Constitution also requires, however, that Washington's assisted-suicide ban be rationally
related to legitimate government interests.” Id.
52.
E.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (“[E]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.” (footnotes omitted) (citing San Antonio Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973))).
53.
Id. at 319 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall explains how there should
be a middle ground between mere rationality and strict scrutiny because when “a statute is
subject to strict scrutiny, the statute always, or nearly always . . . is struck down.” Id.. But,
when strict scrutiny is not used, all remaining legislature falls into the bottom tier of mere
rationality and the “challenged legislature is always upheld.” Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008), reh’g denied,
538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008).
56.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2007).
57.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 741.
58.
Id. at 741.
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Adam & Eve, Inc., a business that did not have public facilities in Texas,
but sold sexual devices via the internet and mail, joined the suit in the Austin federal court.59 The District Court for the Western District of Texas upheld the law as constitutional and entered an order to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.60 The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
to assess “the constitutionality of a Texas statute making it a crime to promote or sell sexual devices.”61 The Fifth Circuit first addressed the issue of
standing, as most courts do when a vendor is asserting the rights of its customers, and found that the United States Supreme Court has consistently
upheld the standing of vendors to challenge the constitutionality of statutes
on their customers' behalf, where those statutes are directed at the activity
of the vendors.62 The Fifth Circuit weighed the constitutionality of the
Texas statute and, in a 2-1 decision, rejected the State’s argument that the
statute served the interest in protecting “minors and unwilling adults from
exposure to sexual devices and their advertisement,”63 and held that the
statute “impermissibly burden[ed an individual’s] substantive due process
right[] to engage in private intimate conduct of their choosing.”64 As a result, the statute was unconstitutional.65
The majority opinion66 in Reliable used the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence v. Texas67 to recognize sexual privacy as a constitutional right:

59.
Id. at 741-42.
60.
Id. at 740.
61.
Id.
62.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 743; see, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S.
678, 682-84 (1977) (holding that a mail-order seller of non-medical contraceptives had
standing to argue that a state statute prohibiting the distribution of non-medical contraceptives violated its customers' substantive due process rights to use such contraceptives); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (holding that a beer seller had standing to challenge a
state statute on behalf of certain underage customers); see also United States v. Extreme
Assocs., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that vendor of obscene materials
had standing to challenge federal obscenity statute on behalf of customers).
63.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 746. The court stated, “It is undeniable that the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from improper sexual expression.
However, the State's generalized concern for children does not justify such a heavy-handed
restriction on the exercise of a constitutionally protected individual right.” Id. The court
subsequently used this line of reasoning to determine that “[u]ltimately, because we can
divine no rational connection between the statute and the protection of children, and because
the State offers none, we cannot sustain the law under this justification.” Id.
64.
Id. at 744. The Fifth Circuit held, 2-1, that the “morality-based” justification for
the statute could not be justified when such appreciable privacy rights were at stake. Id.
65.
Id.
66.
As a result of this Note focusing on the arguments presented in the dissenting
opinions to Reliable, such discussion of the dissenting opinions is reserved for Parts IV and
V. See discussion infra Parts IV-V.
67.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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The right the Court recognized was not simply a right
to engage in the sexual act itself, but instead a right to be
free from governmental intrusion regarding “the most private human contact, sexual behavior.” That Lawrence recognized this as a constitutional right is the only way to
make sense of the fact that the Court explicitly chose to answer the following question in the affirmative: “We granted
certiorari . . . [to resolve whether] petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home
violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.68
The Reliable court framed the issue as recognizing a sexual privacy right
rather than a commercial right.69 Additionally, the court treated this sexual
privacy right as if it were a fundamental right, although the court did not
explicitly state that in the majority opinion.70
The court in Reliable used the Supreme Court’s holding in Carey71 to
conclude that when “[a]n individual who wants to legally use a safe sexual
device during private intimate moments alone or with another is unable to
legally purchase a device in Texas,” such legislation is unconstitutional
because it too heavily burdens an individual from exercising this right.72
Additionally, because the Texas statute in Reliable made it illegal to
“lend”73 or “give”74 a sexual device to another person, the Reliable court
arrived at the conclusion that since the Supreme Court in Carey and Griswold held that “restricting commercial transactions unconstitutionally burdened the exercise of individual rights,”75 it was appropriate for them to
68.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 744 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564).
69.
Id. (“Because of Lawrence, the issue before us is whether the Texas statute
impermissibly burdens the individual’s substantive due process right to engage in private
intimate conduct of his or her choosing.”).
70.
Id. at 749 (Barskdale, J., dissenting) (“[T]he level of scrutiny to be employed is
of critical importance to our review.” Id. He goes on to conclude that “Lawrence declined to
employ a fundamental-rights analysis, choosing instead to apply rational basis.”)
71.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
72.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 744 (“This conclusion is consistent with the decisions in
Carey and Griswold, where the Court held that restricting commercial transactions unconstitutionally burdened the exercise of individual rights.” (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965))).
73.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(5) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2007) (defining
the crime to “promote” to include to “give” or “lend”).
74.
Id.
75.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 744 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977)). Although the author of this
Note does not agree that this was ultimately what the Court in both cases did, the author
believes that reading each case’s holding so broadly—to say that the state may never regu-
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find that the statute went beyond just regulating a commercial activity and
“undercut[] any argument that the statute only affects public conduct.”76
Although the Reliable court signaled its use of other United States Supreme Court precedents to support its contention in finding sexual privacy
rights, it is clear that the Reliable majority’s main contention rested upon
the precedent of Lawrence when invalidating the Texas statute.77 Thus, it is
imperative to examine Lawrence and the criticisms of its holding when
pertaining to the scope of its application and standard of review.78

IV.

WHERE THE RELIABLE MAJORITY’S ARGUMENT BEGAN:
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS

Martin Luther King Jr. once said, “An individual who breaks a law
that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of
imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its
injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for the law.”79 In a way,
the petitioners in Lawrence v. Texas did just that—challenged a statute they
were guilty of violating, and by doing so, opened up a constitutional debate
of sexual privacy rights.80 Thus, before the validity of the Reliable holding
can properly be examined, it is necessary to first analyze dissenting Judge
Garza’s main contention—the Reliable court improperly extended the holding of Lawrence.81
Lawrence involved a statute82 that made it a crime for homosexuals to
engage in certain sexual conduct that remained legal for heterosexuals—
sodomy. Officers of the Harris County Police Department in Houston,
Texas, entered the apartment of John Geddes Lawrence in response to a
reported weapons disturbance.83 When the officers entered the apartment,
they observed Lawrence and Tyron Garner engaging in homosexual sodomy.84 Lawrence and Garner challenged the statute as a violation of the
late commercial activity that burdens a right—is dangerous. As the Reliable court does not
advance any standard by which it comes to its conclusion, this language could potentially to
invoke an unintended precedent in the Fifth Circuit. See id.
76.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 744.
77.
Id. at 746.
78.
See discussion infra Part IV.
79.
Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in AFRICAN
INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE 740, 744 (Molefi Kete Asante & Abu S. Abarry eds., 1996).
80.
See Michael J. Hooi, Substantive Due Process: Sex Toys After Lawrence, 60
FLA. L. REV. 507, 511 (2008); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental
Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1944 (2004);
81.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 365 (5th Cir. 2008).
82.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2007).
83.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003).
84.
Id. at 563.
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment85 and also challenged a similar provision of the Texas Constitution;86 however, their contentions were rejected, and subsequently, they pleaded nolo contendere—
resulting in each being fined $200 plus court costs.87 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourteenth District of Texas also rejected the constitutional arguments88 and affirmed the convictions.89 In 2003, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and, in a 6-3 decision, struck down the Texas antisodomy law, because the statute unconstitutionally interfered with the liberty of intimate consensual sexual conduct that was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.90
Following the decision in Lawrence, a wave of litigation demanding
that the sexual privacy “rights” enumerated in Lawrence be recognized.91
In the majority opinion for Lawrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy stated,
To say that the issue . . . was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it
to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to
be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a
particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though,
have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the
most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the
most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled
to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.92
The court in Reliable used the above excerpt from Lawrence to decide what
right was at stake: “[T]he right the Court recognized was not simply a right
to engage in the sexual act itself, but instead a right to be free from governmental intrusion regarding ‘the most private human contact [sic], sexual

85.
Id.
86.
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
87.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
88.
The constitutional arguments came under both the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 585.
91.
Lisa K. Parshall, Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
and the Concept of Emergent Rights, 69 ALB. L. REV. 237, 250-70 (2005).
92.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added).
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behavior.’”93 The Reliable court further reasoned that because the Supreme
Court in Lawrence answered the following issue in the affirmative, the issue before the court was one of sexual privacy, not commercial regulation:
“We granted certiorari . . . [to resolve whether] petitioners’ criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital
interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”94 Subsequently, the court in Reliable framed the
issue as follows: “[W]hether the Texas statute impermissibly burdens the
individual’s substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choosing.”95
In the Reliable majority’s analysis, the court found that because the
statute makes it illegal to even lend or give a sexual device to another person, the statute regulates much more than just commercial activity.96 The
court further stated that while being compelled to apply Lawrence, the justifications for the statute were “morality based,”97 and thus, a statute based
on solely moral justifications cannot be constitutionally valid after Lawrence, because the government may not “burden consensual private intimate conduct simply by deeming it morally offensive.”98 Furthermore, the
Reliable majority found that “the Texas statute cannot define sexual devices
themselves as obscene and prohibit their sale.”99 There is debate, however,
about reading Lawrence, or more notably Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers,100 too broadly so that the resulting precedent creates a chilling effect on
appropriate legislation reflecting morals.101
93.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567), reh’g denied, 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008).
94.
Id. at 744 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564).
95.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 744.
96.
Id. (identifying title 9, section 43.21(a)(5) of the Texas Penal Code as defining
“promote” to include to “give” or “lend” (citing TEX. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §43.21(a)(5) (2009)).
97.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 745.
98.
Id. at 745. Justice Kennedy, in his majority opinion in Lawrence, found that
Justice Stevens’s previous dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), should have been controlling
there and subsequently should be controlling in Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78
(2003). The Supreme Court in Bowers previously upheld the validity of an anti-sodomy
statute by finding the moral justifications of anti-sodomy and anti-homosexual legislation to
be a proper government interest. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. In his dissent, Justice Stevens
stated that “the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 747. Additionally, the court stated that “[w]hatever one
might think or believe about the use of these devices, government interference with the
personal and private use violates the Constitution.” Id.
100.
See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216.
101.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that the liberty rationale for invalidating bans on same-sex sodomy statutes that the
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The majority in Reliable reasoned that although Lawrence narrowed
its applicable scope to not include the “commercial sale of sex,”102 that exclusion was intended to only indicate that Lawrence’s precedent would specifically not compel a court to strike down a law criminalizing prostitution103 and not exempt the constitutionality of laws prohibiting the sale of
devices used for the “pursuit of sexual gratification unrelated to procreation.”104 Thus, the holding in Lawrence is not inapplicable to a statute prohibiting the sale and distribution of sexual devices, because the simple sale
of sexual devices does not unequivocally fall into the realm of the “sale of
sex.”105
In his dissenting opinion in Reliable, Circuit Judge Rhesa Hawkins
Barksdale directly opposed the majority’s analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process claim.106 Judge Barksdale brought
attention to the majority’s critical error in failing to determine what level of
scrutiny should apply to this substantive due process claim.107 He believed
that the majority completely avoided the standard of review issue by misinterpreting Lawrence, and quoted the majority as stating,
The Supreme Court did not address the classification [of
the level of scrutiny], nor do we need to do so, because the
[Lawrence] Court expressly held that “individual decisions
by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their
physical relationship, even when not intended to produce
offspring, are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due
majority argues as constitutionally impermissible will render invalid other moral legislation
including bans on consensual incestuous relationships); see also Tribe, supra note 80, at
1944.
102.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 746.
103.
See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 458 F. Supp. 2d 730, 732 (N.D. Ind. 2006)
(“Lawrence held only that a state cannot enact laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy; it
did not address the constitutionality of prostitution statutes. . . . [I]t would be an untenable
stretch to find that Lawrence necessarily renders (or even implies) laws prohibiting prostitution . . . unconstitutional.”).
104.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 746.
105.
Id. The Reliable court noted that the Court in Lawrence stated, “The present
case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or
who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.” Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578) (emphasis
added). Thus, the Court attempted to provide guideposts to the applicability of Lawrence.
Here, the most significant debate is whether or not the commercial sale or distribution of
devices intended for sexual stimulation falls within this category of “commercial sale of
sex,” which the Court in Lawrence forewarned as being inapplicable. See Lawrence, 539
U.S at 578.
106.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 749 (Barksdale, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
107.
Id.
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover,
this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as
well as married persons.”108
As Judge Barksdale found there was no fundamental right at issue, he urged
that because “Lawrence declined to employ a fundamental-rights analysis,
choosing instead to apply rational-basis review,”109 the statute in the case at
hand should be upheld pursuant to the rational-basis standard of review.110
He specifically cited Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama111—an
Eleventh Circuit case that upheld a materially identical statute112—and language from the Lawrence opinion itself.113 Additionally, Judge Barksdale
agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in Williams that the limitation of morality
as a legitimate government interest is only focused on “laws that target
conduct that is both private and non-commercial.”114 A more comprehensive discussion regarding the standard of review follows in Part V.A, and
the circuit split with Williams will be addressed in Part V.C.
In summary, the majority in Reliable found that the statute was not
about public sex or controlling commerce, but instead was simply geared
towards the State “controlling what people do in the privacy of their own
homes because the State is morally opposed to a certain type of consensual
private intimate conduct”115—thus, being compelled by Lawrence, the statute was unconstitutional.116 The dissenting opinion, however, found that the
majority erred in ignoring the importance of articulating the standard of
review to be applied, as well as erroneously extending the liberty interests
announced in Lawrence to strike down a constitutional statute that targets
public and commercial conduct—both of which may be properly regulated
by the State as a legitimate government interest concerning morality.117

108.
Id. at 749 (first alteration in original) (quoting Reliable, 517 F.3d at 744 (majority opinion)).
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.
Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004); see discussion infra Part V.C.
112.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 749.
113.
Id. (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.” (quoting Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003))).
114.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 749 (quoting Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1322
(11th Cir. 2007)).
115.
Id. at 746.
116.
Id.
117.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 748-50.
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UN-RELIABLE: DISSENTING OPINIONS TO THE DENIAL OF
REHEARING EN BANC OF RELIABLE

After the Reliable case was originally decided by the Fifth Circuit, the
State of Texas petitioned for a rehearing en banc.118 The majority of judges
denied the petition for rehearing en banc without comment;119 however, the
dissenting judges published their opinion opposing the denial for rehearing,
which provides the foundation for this Note.120 Judge Emilio Garza contended that Reliable “extends Lawrence v. Texas without warrant; conflicts
with the decisions of other circuits; . . . and [conflicts with other state] Supreme Court precedent upholding similar sexual device legislation.”121 The
dissent goes on to say that the Reliable majority “exploited the [Lawrence]
decision’s broad and vague statements about liberty while ignoring the
Court’s self-imposed limits on its applications.”122 The following sections
assess these arguments and contend that the dissent’s reasoning behind each
argument was unsound, although the ultimate legal conclusion that the dissent advocated for was correct.
A.

LEGISLATING FROM THE BENCH: AN IMPROPER EXTENSION OF
LAWRENCE

Judge Barksdale, in his dissenting opinion in the original Reliable
Consultants, Inc. v. Earle case, focused on the majority’s critical mistake:
treating the sexual liberty interest enumerated in Lawrence as a fundamental right.123 Thus, the majority erroneously subjected the Texas statute to the
most tenacious standard of review—strict scrutiny.124 Accordingly, Circuit
Judge Emilio M. Garza, in his dissenting opinion to the denial of rehearing
en banc, focused his main contention of dissent on the premise that the Reliable majority made two critical errors when analyzing Lawrence: “[T]hey
misunderstood the right announced in Lawrence, and they extended that
right far beyond its limits.”125

118.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008). A rehearing en
banc is a subsequent hearing of a case or an appeal with all judges present and participating
to consider an alleged error or omission in the court’s judgment or opinion. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 606, 1399 (9th ed. 2009).
119.
See Reliable, 538 F.3d at 355-56.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. (citation omitted).
122.
Id. at 356 (alteration in original).
123.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 749 (5th Cir. 2008), reh’g
denied, 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008).
124.
Id.
125.
Reliable, 538 F.3d at 358 (Garza, J., dissenting).
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The standard of review applied to a substantive due process claim is
essential to the life or death of the constitutional validity of the statute being
challenged.126 A paramount criticism to the majority opinion in Lawrence is
the ambiguity in addressing what standard of review the Court employed.127
The fact that Lawrence specifically held that the statute furthered “no legitimate state interest” when striking it down suggested that the Court was
applying a rational-basis standard of review.128 Traditionally, a statute under the review of a rational-basis standard would be given profound deference and would nearly always withstand a constitutional challenge.129 Justice Scalia vehemently argued in his dissenting opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas that the test employed by the majority is one of rational basis, and as
a result, the Texas statute should be upheld.130 Similar to the qualms Justice
Scalia had with the rational-basis test employed and the seemingly uncorrelated outcome, Judge Garza, in his dissenting opinion to the denial of a rehearing for Reliable, similarly reasoned that even though “the Reliable ma126.
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion to Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, stated,
“If a statute is subject to strict scrutiny, the statute always, or nearly always is struck down . .
. . For that test [the mere rationality/rational-basis test], too, when applied as articulated,
leaves little doubt about the outcome; the challenged legislation is always upheld.” Mass.
Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
127.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592-94 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia argued that “[n]ot once does it [the majority decision] describe homosexual
sodomy as a ‘fundamental right’ or a ‘fundamental liberty interest,’ nor does it subject the
Texas statute to strict scrutiny.” Id. at 594 (alteration in original). He feared that the majority
opinion, in failing to enumerate what standard of review the Court was employing, would
cause confusion when determining what the proper level of review should be when handling
a case involving a similar interest since the statute should clearly—and as the majority fails
to rebut—be scrutinized under a rational-basis test. See id. at 599.
128.
Tribe, supra note 80, at 1917 n.83. Tribe stated that
[t]he strictness of the scrutiny employed in Roe was explicit. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (invoking the need for a “compelling
state interest” and for narrow tailoring—the twin signifiers of strict scrutiny—in order for the Texas abortion statute to survive constitutional
challenge (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To be
sure, the Lawrence Court did use language suggestive of rational basis
review as well when it proclaimed that the law before it “furthers no legitimate state interest,” 123 S. Ct. at 2484, the phrase cited by Justice
Scalia as proof that the Court was applying rational basis review, see id.
at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting), albeit of an “unheard-of form,” see id. at
2488. Far from implying that any “legitimate state interest” would have
sufficed, however, the Court's reference was to a “legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual,” Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (emphasis added)—an intrusion the Court had already concluded was of great significance.
Id.
129.
See id.
130.
See id.
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jority seemed to acknowledge that Lawrence did not recognize a fundamental right, they failed to acknowledge that Lawrence recognized only a narrow liberty interest worthy of rational basis review,” and therefore “recast
the right announced in Lawrence as something outside of substantive due
process jurisprudence entirely.”131
Was the majority in Lawrence really compelled to use the magic
words “fundamental right,” however, to employ a standard of review similar to strict scrutiny? Some scholars have engaged in a debate about
whether or not Lawrence v. Texas truly implements a traditional rationalbasis standard of review.132 Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard Law
School, Laurence Henry Tribe, makes a compelling argument that although
the majority in Lawrence did not use the “magic words proclaiming the
right protected in Lawrence to be ‘fundamental,’”133 the right recognized
was nevertheless “fundamental.”134 He argues that although no clear “standard” was explicitly enumerated in Griswold v. Connecticut, “what we
would today call ‘strict scrutiny’ was plainly at work.”135 Additionally,
Tribe contends that although the word “fundamental” did not directly precede the word “right,” the Court in Lawrence did invoke “the talismanic
verbal formula of substantive due process but did so by putting the key
words in one unusual sequence or another.”136 Unconvinced by this argument, the dissent in Reliable pointed to cases in both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits that determined that the Lawrence Court had clearly employed
a rational-basis standard of review, and, in doing so, found no fundamental
right or fundamental liberty interest.137 Even so, did the majority in Reliable
in fact find a fundamental right? In reading the language of the majority

131.
Reliable Consultants, Inc v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J.,
dissenting).
132.
See Tribe, supra note 80, at 1916-20 (arguing that although the Court in Lawrence does not explicitly say the interest at stake is a “fundamental right,” it does not necessarily have to in order to treat a right asserted as “fundamental”).
133.
Id. at 1917.
134.
See id.
135.
See id. at 1917 n.82.
136.
See id. at 1917 (“[A]s in the Court’s declaration that it was dealing with a ‘protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause [that] has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person” (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 565 (2003)).
137.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771-72 (10th Cir. 2008)) (noting that Seegmiller
sustained an executive action under rational-basis review in light of Lawrence); see also
Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that the Lawrence opinion ultimately applied rational-basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, to the
challenged statute).
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opinion, the court struck down the statute because they could “divine no
rational connection between the statute and the protection of children.”138
The language of “rational connection” would seem to suggest the majority was employing a rational-basis standard of review, not strict scrutiny;139 and as a result, the absence of addressing whether or not the right at
stake was fundamental would not be outcome determinative.
In addition, a standard of review outside the two-tier approach has
evolved, which is not necessarily compelled to implement either strict scrutiny or simple rational basis—this standard has become known as heightened scrutiny.140 Heightened-scrutiny, or “rational basis with bite,” has
evolved from the strict scrutiny review of equal protection that is invoked
when statutes identify “classifications that disadvantage a ‘suspect class,’ or
that impinge upon a ‘fundamental right.’”141 As evidenced by the Reliable
majority opinion, with the evolvement of heightened-scrutiny in the realm
of equal protection, it could be argued that the Lawrence decision may be a
stepping-stone to the evolution of a heightened-level of scrutiny involving
sexual privacy rights.142 However, this argument may be a frail one at best
as the Supreme Court has been reluctant to extend any new nonfundamental liberty interests into the zone of “fundamental rights;” therefore, the Court would be equally, if not more, reluctant to overlap the standard of review for fundamental rights (strict scrutiny) with those of nonfundamental liberty interests (rational basis) in order to comport with the
doctrine of judicial self-restraint.143 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy has de138.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 746 (5th Cir. 2008) (emphasis
added), reh’g denied, 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008).
139.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 592-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that the language used by the majority opinion showed they were using rational-basis review).
140.
The “heightened scrutiny standard” has been applied by the Supreme Court in
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applied to homosexuals), and City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applied to the mentally retarded). Additionally, Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion in Lawrence that “[w]hen a law
exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection
Clause.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (emphasis
added).
141.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
142.
See generally Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987) (explaining that Lawrence’s holding
seemingly evidenced the application of something more than mere rational-basis review).
143.
See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“As a general
matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process
because guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and
open-ended”) (citing Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26, (1985)).
Additionally, the Court in Collins stated that “[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires
us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.” Id.
The importance of judicial self-restraint has been regarded as:
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scribed certain rights within the scope of sexual privacy to be part of a new
wave of “emergent rights,” which may require a heightened protection on a
case-by-case basis.144 If sexual privacy in fact falls under Justice Kennedy’s
scope of “emergent rights,” this notion, when read into his opinion in Lawrence, may have muster to satisfy the creation of a new level of review that
would mirror the three-tiered review of equal protection categories.145 The
important concept here is that the Lawrence Court’s ambiguity in defining
what level of review was at work, coupled with its inconsistent outcome if
it truly had employed a rational-basis test,146 will inevitably lead to more
circuit splits concerning varying interpretations of what constitutes “sexual
privacy,” and ultimately leave its “fundamental” determination up to each
individual judge as he or she sees fit.147
B.

OVERRULES SUB SILENTIO A PRIOR CONTROLLING DECISION: RED
BLUFF DRIVE-IN, INC. V. VANCE

Red Bluff Drive-In v. Vance concerned entrepreneurs in the “adult entertainment” industry who brought suit against Texas law enforcement officials to enjoin prosecutions under the same Texas obscenity statute that was
challenged in Reliable.148 The revised statute149 at issue was rewritten by
the Texas Legislature in 1979, and shortly before the statute was about to
go into effect, its validity was challenged on several grounds, including

[E]ssential to any discussion of judicial review to recognize that judicial
self-restraint has had a long and honored history, and to the extent that
judicial review was, and has been legitimized, its limits have always
been implicitly recognized. An essential maneuver in the exquisite strategy by which the Courts maintained their cause, despite the rising tide of
democracy, was a prolongation of their advocacy of the Common Law
into fervent adherence to the principle of judicial restraint.
Elliot E. Slotnick, The Place of Judicial Review in the American Tradition: The Emergence
of an Eclectic Power, in JUDICIAL POLITICS: READINGS FROM JUDICATURE 3, 15 (Elliot E.
Slotnick ed., 1999).
144.
Parshall, supra note 91, at 285-86. Emergent rights are “those rights, which as
Justice Kennedy described in Beller, are neither wholly lacking foundation in the ‘continuing traditions’ of our society nor are without close connection to ‘interests recognized as
private and protected.’” Id. at 285 (quoting Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 808 (9th
Cir. 1980)). Parshall suggests that Justice Kennedy, while serving on the Ninth Circuit, may
have carved out a new standard of review that would essentially be a middle tier of due
process analysis that would represent these “emerging rights” and therefore be entitled to a
heightened scrutiny standard of review. Id. at 281-87 (citing Beller, 632 F.2d at 792).
145.
Id. at 285-86.
146.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592-94 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147.
Hooi, supra note 80, at 517-18.
148.
Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (5th Cir. 1981).
149.
TEX. CODE ANN. § 43.21 (Vernon 2003).
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vagueness, overbreadth, and equal protection.150 The court used the 1973
United States Supreme Court obscenity precedent of Miller v. California to
uphold the constitutionality of the Texas obscenity statute.151 The court
found that although there may be numerous hypothetical circumstances in
which the statute would be constitutionally overbroad if so applied, the district court chose to defer to the state courts while construing the statute “to
find marital, medical, and other necessary exceptions narrowing the scope
of the § 43.21(a)(5)’s definition of promote.”152
The dissent in the Reliable denial for rehearing simply found that the
Lawrence holding does not undercut previous United States Supreme Court
precedent permitting obscenity regulation.153 The dissent stated that by ignoring the precedent of Red Bluff—where the constitutionality of the statute
in question was held to be valid—the court improperly broadened the scope
of the narrow personal liberty interest enumerated in Lawrence to include
commercial activity.154 Accordingly, since Red Bluff stood as a legitimate
precedent in the Fifth Circuit, the majority in Reliable was wrong in implicitly overruling this precedent and deciding that the Lawrence decision undercuts the United States Supreme Court’s obscenity jurisprudence.155

150.
Red Bluff, 648 F.2d at 1026-28.
151.
Id. at 1028. To explain the rationale behind the statute’s “community standards”
scope of obscenity limitations, the court quoted Justice Burger’s majority opinion in Miller:
“It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring
that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in
Las Vegas, or New York City.” Id. (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973)).
152.
Id. at 1030. The court additionally stated that although the literal language of the
statute may improperly forbid the most sensitive and intimate conversations involving promotion of sexual devices, the state courts would be able to carve out exceptions to the statute
in order to not wrongfully “sweep within its ambit acts the state cannot criminalize.” Id. at
1029-30.
153.
See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 360 (5th Cir. 2008)
(Garza, J., dissenting). There has been debate, however, about whether or not Lawrence
changes obscenity jurisprudence. Elizabeth M. Glazer, Associate Professor of Law at Hofstra Law School, concluded that:
Lawrence’s equality principle mandates that the obscenity doctrine, or
for that matter any other doctrine, not discriminate against gays and lesbians. Moreover, the transformation of the concept of homosexuality in
Lawrence—from subject matter to viewpoint—mandates on First
Amendment grounds that this sort of content-based restriction is constitutionally permissible.
Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1379, 1433 (2008).
154.
Reliable, 538 F.3d at 360 (Garza, J., dissenting).
155.
Id. (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow
the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions.” (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
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Although it is an interesting argument to make, it is significant to note
that the statute in Red Bluff was not challenged specifically based on a
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process issue; instead the arguments were based more on procedural due process,156 equal protection,157
and overbreadth grounds.158 Lawrence specifically avoided the equal protection issue,159 so as to invoke the substantive due process analysis to better encompass adjudication of the scope of the rights at stake, rather than
revisit an anti-sodomy statute geared towards prohibiting heterosexual and
homosexual sodomy equally somewhere down the foreseeable road.160 Accordingly, rather than overruling Red Bluff sub silentio,161 this Note argues
that since Red Bluff’s policy arguments behind equal protection, procedural
due process, and overbreadth have not changed as a result of Reliable, the
use of Lawrence and the subsequent holding of Reliable simply created an
156.
Red Bluff, 648 F.2d at 1030-32. The court in Red Bluff rejects the procedural
due process argument by stating, “One can certainly imagine hypothetical cases in which the
application of either presumption individually or the confluence of both presumptions could
deny a criminal defendant due process.” Id. at 1032. The case indicates that the court focused on procedural due process rights rather than substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
157.
Id. at 1026-28.
158.
Id. at 1032 (abstaining in regard to hypothetical cases that would deny someone
procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment “or impermissibly burden
First Amendment rights by dispensing with the necessity of proving scienter”).
159.
James W. Paulsen, Significance of Lawrence v. Texas, 41 HOUS. LAW. 32, 34
(2004) (“Substantively, the Court could have grounded its decision on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . An equal protection ruling would have struck
down the Texas statute while avoiding a head-on collision with Bowers.”).
160.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
The Court addressed abstaining from answering the petitioner’s issue using an equal protection analysis; however, it would have been a valid route in striking down the statute, as
Justice O’Connor points out in her concurring opinion:
Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants. Equality of treatment and the due process right to
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of
liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point
advances both interests.
Id. at 574-75.
161.
See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 104 (1996). Professor Vandevelde explains how a case is overruled sub
silentio:
The court generally does this by articulating a set of policy judgments in
a later case that, if applied to the earlier case, would have caused a different result. The court declines to explicitly overrule the prior case, and
yet the lawyer understands that the prior case no longer controls future
decisions.
Id.
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exception162 to Red Bluff. The precedent of Red Bluff can still be transcended into other cases that involve the validity of equal protection issues,
involving people with disabilities and what level of vagueness need be present to overturn a statute. Although the incidental impact of a holding contrary to this statute’s validity did, in all practical matters, render the previous decision ineffective, the grounds on which the statute was held to be
unconstitutional were not the same; thus, the precedent in Red Bluff was not
necessarily overruled insofar as Reliable did not develop new policies under
vagueness or equal protection grounds.163
C.

CREATION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WILLIAMS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
ALABAMA

The case of Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama164 was noticeably parallel to Reliable. The statute in Williams was Alabama’s AntiObscenity Enforcement Act165 which, among other things, prohibited the
commercial distribution of sexual devices similar to the Texas statute.166
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), on behalf of various individual users and vendors of sexual devices, sought to enjoin enforcement of
this Alabama statute by inviting the Eleventh Circuit to find a fundamental
right to sexual privacy and subsequently declare the statute to be an impermissible burden on this right.167 The Williams court answered the ACLU’s
invitation in the negative, holding that no fundamental, substantive due
process right of consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct existed and refused to recognize a new fundamental right concerning the
aforementioned privacy.168 The court noted that the United States Supreme
Court has implicated sexual matters when dealing with “privacy” issues;169

162.
See id. at 105. Professor Vandevelde makes the distinction between a case being
overruled sub silentio and creating an exception to the precedent: “[An exception] is an
explicit, but only partial, repudiation of the prior case. The prior case remains good law, but
it no longer controls all of the situations it once did.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, since
statutes similarly written would still be valid in terms of equal protection and overbreadth,
the case of Red Bluff would not have been overruled sub silentio.
163.
See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) (employing
a substantive due process analysis in order to strike down the Texas statute), reh’g denied,
538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008).
164.
Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
165.
ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (1975).
166.
Compare Reliable, 517 F.3d 738 (citing TEX. CODE ANN. § 43.21 (Vernon
2003)), with Williams, 378 F.3d 1232 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (1975)).
167.
Williams, 378 F.3d 1232.
168.
Id. at 1250.
169.
Id. at 1236. The Williams court mentioned sexually-related privacy cases involving abortion, see id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
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however, the Supreme Court has “never indicated that the mere fact that an
activity is sexual and private entitles it to protection as a fundamental
right.”170 Moreover, the Williams court reasoned that when the Supreme
Court was presented an opportunity to recognize a fundamental right to
sexual privacy in Lawrence, it declined the same invitation that the ACLU
was petitioning the court to recognize in the case at hand.171
The Williams court deferred to the holding of the Supreme Court in
Carey,172 to find that the Supreme Court has continually declined to recognize any free-standing fundamental right to sexual privacy.173 The Williams
court then used Washington v. Glucksberg,174 which provided future courts
a scheme for identifying fundamental rights, to determine whether or not
sexual privacy could arguably be considered a fundamental right.175 This
two-step analytical framework first begins “with a careful description of the
asserted right” and then, most critically, determines whether this asserted
right, carefully described, is one of “those fundamental rights and liberties
which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”176 The “careful description of
the asserted right” prong of the test was to ensure that future courts would
refrain from identifying a fundamental right too broadly, so that unintended
interpretations involving fundamental rights, compelling a court to subject
challenged statutes to strict scrutiny, would not render penal system statutes
unenforceable.177 While employing the Glucksberg test, the court attempted
to define the scope of the liberty interest at stake in reference to the scope
of the Alabama statute, finding that the statute did not implicate a burden
upon any broad right to sexual privacy; rather that the statute banned only
the commercial distribution of sexual devices, and therefore, framed the
issue as “the right to sell and purchase sexual devices.”178

(1992)), and contraceptives, see id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977)).
170.
Id.
171.
Id. (citing Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
815-16 (11th Cir. 2004)). The Eleventh Circuit in Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children & Family Services came to the conclusion that “it is a strained and ultimately incorrect
reading of Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental right.” 358 F.3d 805, 817
(11th Cir. 2004).
172.
Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977).
173.
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1235-36 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 688).
174.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
175.
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239.
176.
Id. (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21).
177.
See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
178.
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1242.
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The Williams court’s analysis, however, went beyond simply the right
to sell and purchase sexual devices, but also included the broad right to use
such devices.179 The court reasoned that “restrictions on the ability to purchase an item are tantamount to restrictions on the use of that item.”180 Although Williams acknowledged this lack of analytical dissimilarity,181 Judge
Garza’s dissent in Reliable failed to recognize Williams’s incorporation of
“use” into the commercial language of the statute to define precisely what
rights were at stake—merely pointing out that the statute “prohibits only
commercial conduct” and refusing to recognize that the statute implicitly
burdened the use of such devices.182 To say that banning the commercial
distribution of sexual devices does not in turn ban the use of such devices
would be the equivalent of saying that the proscription of alcohol sales does
not ban the consumption of it. Is the freedom to use something that is essentially unobtainable any freedom at all? It is not. It is an incendiary for those
still seeking the effects of the prohibited item to venture for alternatives that
could be potentially dangerous. Although sexual devices are technically
alternatives to sex, “[i]n an era where ‘(f)ear of spreading AIDS or another
sexually transmitted disease is compelling grounds to avoid sexual intercourse,’”183 it seems as though the “alternatives” to sexual devices may not
be as innocuous as one may first assume.
Essentially, the effect of the Texas statute in prohibiting the sale, distribution, advertising, lending, and gifting of sexual devices could be over179.
Id.
180.
Id. Williams used Supreme Court precedent in extending its analysis to include
the right to use sexual devices:
Thus it was that the Glucksberg Court analyzed a ban on providing suicide assistance as a burden on the right to receive suicide assistance.
Similarly, prohibitions on the sale of contraceptives [that were analyzed
in Carey] have been analyzed as burdens on the use of contraceptives.
Because a prohibition on the distribution of sexual devices would burden
an individual’s ability to use the devices, our analysis must be framed
not simply in terms of whether the Constitution protects a right to sell
and buy sexual devices, but whether it protects a right to use such devices.
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723; Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l,
431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977)).
181.
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1242.
182.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza,
J., dissenting). Judge Garza uses Williams to point out that Williams refused to extend the
narrow right announced in Lawrence into the commercial distribution of sex toys. Id. at 361.
Although this holding is accurate, Judge Garza fails to recognize that the majority in Williams did constitutionally equate the purchasing and selling of sexual devices to the use of
such said devices. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1242.
183.
Angela Holt, From My Cold Dead Hands: Williams v. Pryor and the Constitutionality of Alabama’s Anti-Vibrator Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 927, 942-44 (2002) (citing Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 1999)).
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regulating sexual devices to the point that the statute, in all practical matters, denies the use of sexual devices.184 Just as a point of comparison, the
recent United States Supreme Court case of District of Columbia v. Heller
involved a Second Amendment185 challenge to a licensing scheme that prohibited the use of a firearm in the home without a license.186 The Respondent, Dick Heller, was a D.C. special police officer that had authorization to
carry a handgun while on duty but was denied a registration certificate for a
handgun he wished to have in his home.187 He sought to enjoin the District
of Columbia from enforcing the licensing requirement for handguns carried
in the home, but more relevantly, the trigger-lock requirement “insofar as it
prohibits the use of ‘functional firearms within the home.’”188 The district
court dismissed his complaint, while the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed, holding that the Second Amendment protected an individual’s right to possess certain firearms189 and that the nonfunctional requirement that prohibited individuals from using handguns in the home in
cases of self-defense violated the Second Amendment.190 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the District of Columbia's
“ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment,
as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home
operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”191
Obviously, a handgun and a vibrator are not comparable in terms of
constitutional significance; nevertheless, the provision192 in Heller, rendering any handgun in the home inoperable, is arguably over-regulating its use
insomuch that it is effectively banning all lawful uses.193 Similarly, although the Texas statute in Reliable, at least on its face, is a prohibition on
the sale of sexual devices, because the statute defines “promote” to include
“manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, or advertise,
or to offer or agree to do the same,” it seems as though the statute is doing
184.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008) (identifying Texas Penal Code § 43.21(a)(5) as defining “promote” to include to “give” or “lend,”
and as a result regulates much more than simply commercial activity), reh’g denied, 538
F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008).
185.
U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).
186.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008).
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
Id. at 2817 (recognizing that although handguns are protected, this protection
would not extend to the carrying of “dangerous or unusual weapons”).
190.
Id.
191.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821-22.
192.
D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2008).
193.
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818-19.
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much more than simply regulating commercial activity—as applied, the
statute is rendering the use of sexual devices impossible by directly and
indirectly denying anyone within the state the ability to purchase these devices.194 Although this conclusion is quite the extrapolation, if Lawrence is
read to recognize sexual privacy as a fundamental right and the use of sexual devices protected under the ambit of this privacy right, then such a statute that over-regulates use, as the Texas statute does, would be unconstitutional.
Interestingly, there has been debate between whether or not the use of
sexual devices is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” as
required by the Glucksberg test to recognize a new fundamental right.195 Dr.
Rachel Maines, a historian, traced the history of women using vibrators
before 1900, and even for personal home-use immediately after 1900.196
Additionally, Lawrence was careful to point out that “[h]istory and tradition
are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive
due process inquiry.”197 The dissent in Williams was quick to point to Lawrence’s emphasis on specifically finding relevant the “laws and traditions
in the past half century.”198 It is important to note, however, that the dissent
in Williams also rationalized that Lawrence declared a substantive due
process right to sexual privacy.199 In doing so, the dissent may have been
confused as to why the Lawrence Court looked to more contemporary “traditions”—not to find a new fundamental right like the Glucksberg test is
intended to provide guidance for, but simply to show “an emerging aware194.
TEX. CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(5) (Vernon 2003).
195.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
196.
Holt, supra note 183, at 942-44 (citing RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF
ORGASM: “HYSTERIA,” THE VIBRATOR AND WOMEN'S SEXUAL SATISFACTION 3 (1999)). According to Holt’s article, which summarizes some of Maines’s research, vibrators were as
much part of our nation’s contemporary history as the sewing machine:
[A]fter 1900, women began purchasing vibrators for self-treatment at
home. Electric lights were introduced in 1876, and the first home appliance to be electrified was the sewing machine in 1889. The sewing machine was followed in the next ten years by the fan, the teakettle, the
toaster and the vibrator, which preceded the electric vacuum cleaner by
nine years, the electric iron by ten, and the electric frying pan by more
than a decade, “possibly reflecting consumer priorities.” A 1908 vibrator
advertisement in the National Home Journal proclaimed “Gentle, soothing, invigorating and refreshing. Invented by a woman who knows a
woman's needs. All nature pulsates and vibrates with life.”
Id. at 943 (citing RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF ORGASM: “HYSTERIA,”
THE VIBRATOR AND WOMEN'S SEXUAL SATISFACTION 3 (1999)).
197.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998))
198.
Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett,
J., dissenting) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572).
199.
Id. at 1252 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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ness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”200 Since the
Lawrence majority did not utilize the Glucksberg test to determine whether
or not sexual privacy was a fundamental right, as well as employed rational-basis scrutiny, the relevance of “traditions in the past half century”
was more likely to just observe that Bowers understated the historical premises the Court based its decision on, in order to provide the Lawrence Court
with sufficient basis to overturn Bowers.201
Additionally, the commercial distinction of sex toys, as made apparent
in the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Lawrence,202 which the Reliable
dissenting opinions (in both the original case and the denial for rehearing)
heavily relied upon,203 may not have been interpreted accurately. The Eleventh Circuit in Williams v. Morgan, which emerged from a second appeal
after the Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama case was remanded,204
relied on the following excerpt from Lawrence in making the inference that
Lawrence did not intend to extend to commercial activity: “The present
case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might
not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.”205
The language from Morgan, which Judge Barksdale relied upon in his dissenting-in-part opinion from the original Reliable case,206 equated “public
conduct” to commercial activity.207 When the Lawrence Court spoke of
public conduct, however, they specifically addressed “public conduct” to
200.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
201.
See id. at 571-72. The Court in Lawrence cites Chief Justice Burger’s incorrect
sweeping historical findings of Western civilization’s condemnation of homosexual conduct
in Bowers in order to overturn Bowers. See id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
196 (1986)). Interestingly, Lawrence also looked to Europe and other authorities not binding
on the United States Supreme Court in order to research the abolishment of laws that proscribe conduct involving sodomy and other homosexual conduct. Id. at 573-74.
202.
See Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) (“However,
while the statute at issue in Lawrence criminalized private sexual conduct, the statute at
issue in this case forbids public, commercial activity. To the extent Lawrence rejects public
morality as a legitimate government interest, it invalidates only those laws that target conduct that is both private and non-commercial. Unlike Lawrence, the activity regulated here is
neither private nor non-commercial.” (citation omitted) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)).
203.
See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 749 (5th Cir. 2008)
(Barksdale, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), reh’g denied, 538 F.3d 355, 359-61
(5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J., dissenting).
204.
Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004), remanded to
Williams v. King, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (N.D. Ala. 2006), aff’d, Williams v. Morgan, 478
F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007).
205.
Morgan, 478 F.3d at 1322 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
206.
Reliable, 517 F.3d at 749 (Barksdale, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Morgan, 478 F.3d at 1322).
207.
Morgan, 478 F.3d at 1322.
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mean sex in public places; never specifically and exclusively mentioning
commercial conduct.208 In fact, the only place in the Lawrence decision
where the word “commercial” is even used is in Justice Thomas’s dissent,
and even there he only referred to “commercial sex” in the context of prostitution.209 Therefore, it seems to be an incorrect reading of Lawrence by
the Eleventh Circuit210 in finding that the right of privacy announced in
Lawrence clearly did not extend “to cover the commercial distribution of
sex toys”211 as a direct result of the “public conduct” language in the Lawrence opinion.212

VI.

CONCLUSION

Arguably, the ultimate outcome of the case of Reliable Consultants,
Inc. v. Earle213 was wrong, yet the dissenting opinion to the denial of a rehearing en banc cannot be accepted in its entirety as correctly stating the
problems associated with the majority opinion in Reliable.214 First, the dissent’s blind acceptance of its sister-circuit’s decision in the Williams case
was without proper caution and absent the critical interpretation that should
be necessary when using extra-jurisdictional law, which is not binding on
the court, to render a decision.215 Additionally, although courts must be

208.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570 (“The reported decisions concerning the prosecution
of consensual, homosexual sodomy between adults for the years 1880-1995 are not always
clear in the details, but a significant number involved conduct in a public place.”). In following the citation to the ACLU’s brief, the information cited in the brief relates specifically to
prosecutions for sex in public; commercial sex referring to “sex for money,” i.e. prostitution.
See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
2003 WL 164132, 14-15, nn.17-18 (2003).
209.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Punishing someone for
expressing his sexual preference through noncommercial consensual conduct with another
adult does not appear to be a worthy way to expend valuable law enforcement resources.”).
210.
See Morgan, 478 F.3d at 1322; Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232,
1250 (11th Cir. 2004).
211.
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1250 (citing Lawrence 539 U.S. at 578).
212.
See id. (holding that there is no “constitutional right to privacy to cover the
commercial distribution of sex toys”); see also Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d
355, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J., dissenting) (using the Williams analysis of Lawrence
as a comparative foundation in arguing for the validity of the Texas statute).
213.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that
the statute was invalid because it impermissibly burdened customers’ substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of their choosing), reh’g denied, 538 F.3d 355
(5th Cir. 2008).
214.
See discussion supra Part V.
215.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
The Court emphasized its reluctance in overturning a precedent and its purpose in being
averse to doing so:

www.niulawreview.org

Fall 2009]

TOY STORY

29

hesitant in overturning a controlling precedent, the incidental effects of a
decision invalidating a statute’s constitutionality does not necessarily overturn that precedent if that decision was reached on separate constitutional
grounds.216 Finally, the contention that Lawrence v. Texas was improperly
used217 was arguably the best argument made; however, the reasoning of
each dissent was not entirely sound.218
If for no other reason to find reversible error, the majority in Reliable
erred in making no explicit explanation of what standard of review was
being used219—the majority merely struck down the statute because of a
broad right to sexual privacy that it read out of Lawrence and proclaimed to
be binding on the court.220 It is dangerous to read a right of privacy too
broadly, because, in doing so, its effect could potentially validate otherwise
invalid constitutional challenges meant to render null and void appropriate
penal statutes and wane the states’ respective policing powers.221 Despite
the fact that the arguments made by scholars like Professor Tribe are excep-

The Court is not asked to do this very often [overturn a precedent], having thus addressed the Nation only twice in our lifetime, in the decisions
of Brown and Roe. But when the Court does act in this way, its decision
requires an equally rare precedential force to counter the inevitable efforts to overturn it and to thwart its implementation. Some of those efforts may be mere unprincipled emotional reactions; others may proceed
from principles worthy of profound respect. But whatever the premises
of opposition may be, only the most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later
decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to political
pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the
Court staked its authority in the first instance. So to overrule under fire
in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed
decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question.
Id. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit follows a similar guideline to overrule another
panel’s decision: “[O]ne panel of this court cannot overrule the decision of another
panel; such panel decisions may be overruled only by a subsequent decision of the
Supreme Court or by the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc.” Lowrey v. Tex. A & M
Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). This rule is also cited by Judge
Elrod in his dissenting opinion. Reliable, 538 F.3d at 365 (5th Cir. 2008) (Elrod,
J., dissenting).
216.
See discussion supra Part V.B.
217.
Reliable, 538 F.3d at 358-65 (Garza, J., dissenting and Elrod, J., dissenting).
218.
See discussion supra Part V.
219.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744-45 (5th Cir. 2008), reh’g
denied, 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008).
220.
Id.
221.
See, e.g., Cawood v. Haggard, 327 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877-79 (E.D. Tenn. 2004)
(finding that the defendant could not attempt to justify the legality of prostitution through
using the sexual liberty announced in Lawrence).
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tionally interesting,222 it seems more likely that Lawrence v. Texas did not
recognize a fundamental right since the standard of review the Court employed used the language of rational basis.223 Due to the ambiguity of the
Lawrence opinion, however, the door has been left open to the notion of
“emergent rights.” As a result, a third, middle-tier form of review may have
incidentally been created, similar to the standards of review for equal protection challenges. Lawrence was unusual in not only its absence of the
talismanic language that typically creates or recognizes a fundamental right
or otherwise, but also in its observation of courts and cultures outside of the
United States in defining the rights at stake.224 What is certain, however, is
that courts across the United States have read into the Lawrence opinion
both broadly and narrowly.225 The core lesson that should be learned from
cases like that of Reliable Consultants v. Earle is how the case demonstrates the far-reaching effects of broad precedent. Until the United States
Supreme Court determines the applicable scope of Lawrence v. Texas, incorrect applications of its precedent will continue to occur between circuits
deciding the constitutionality of statutes that implicate rights within the
ambit of sexual privacy or sexual liberty rights.226
Texas, a state that, before the Reliable decision, upheld anti-vibrator
statutes,227 may be a catalyst for the emergence of successful constitutional
attacks on the validity of such statutes. Currently, courts in Texas, Colorado, Kansas, and Louisiana have struck down the constitutionality of antivibrator statutes, while Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Virginia have upheld similar laws that ban the sale, distribution, or promotion of sexual devices.228 Unfortunately, other circuits
choosing to follow the vague majority opinion in Reliable will most likely
encounter disparagement; therefore, Reliable is unlikely to summon up a
following. But despite the problems with Reliable, it is likely that such antivibrator statutes will eventually phase out in due time as a result of an
emerging scheme of Supreme Court decisions that reflect notions of sexual

222.
See supra text accompanying notes 128-36.
223.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 538 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (“The Texas statute furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the individual’s personal and
private life.” (emphasis added)).
224.
Id. at 572-73.
225.
Parshall, supra note 91, at 297-98.
226. See Glazer, supra note 153, at 1411-15 (stating that the “holding of Lawrence
was anything but straight-forward”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, What did Lawrence Hold?
Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 29 (characterizing the decision as “remarkably opaque”).
227.
Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1981).
228.
Holt, supra note 183, at 933-38.
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privacy.229 To the extent of how fundamental a right sexual privacy will
become, and ultimately to what limitations that right may encompass, will
be left up to future generations, made up of varying Justices with varying
perspectives,230 to determine to what length the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive due process clause protects any person from the deprivation of
“life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law.”231 Perhaps Justice Kennedy’s search for the “greater freedom” provides the best insight as
to how the Court will envision the future possibilities of sexual privacy
rights:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment known
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they
might have been more specific. They did not presume to
have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
to be necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As
the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can
invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.232
STEVEN L. BOLDT*

229.
Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting). Judge Barkett states that “included within this right to privacy is the
ability to make decisions about intimate sexual matters.” Id. He cites Carey v. Population
Services, International, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (right to use contraception), and Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (right to seek out an abortion), as
a scheme of cases identifying a right to sexual privacy. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1252-53.
230.
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 850 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Thurgood Marshall criticized the majority for overruling precedent—Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)—since
“neither the law nor the facts . . . underwent any change in the last four years.” Id. at 844.
Justice Marshall goes on to point out that the majority’s own personal and individual feelings towards the law was what ultimately changed the law: “It takes little detective work to
discern just what has changed in Booth and Gathers: this Court’s own personnel.” Id. at 850;
see also James F. Spriggs & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091, 1091-111 (2001) (“Marshall, of course, was referring to Justice Kennedy’s and Souter’s replacement of, respectively, Powell and Brennan
between the time when the Court decided and subsequently overruled the two precedents
[Booth and Gathers].”).
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
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